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Corporate DisloyaltyA Wyoming Case and the ALI Project
Harvey Gelb*
The Wyoming Supreme Court recently had the opportunity
to resolve a number of issues relating to corporatefiduciary standards. In the process, the court construed Wyoming's Business
CorporationAct, which is patterned after the Model Business CorporationAct. Using this case as a backdrop, the author reviews
proposals by the American Law Institute regarding the duty of
loyalty that directorsowe to their corporationin conflict of interest
transactions.The authorargues that the proposals unduly dilute
the duty of directors. The author concludes that the trend away
from imposing a high duty of loyalty on directors in conflict of
interest transactions unfairly leaves minority shareholders and
creditors without protection.
Wyoming, unlike Delaware and a number of other jurisdictions, is not
a prolific breeder of corporate caselaw. When a case is decided like Lynch
v. Patterson,' (Lynch) which deals with a multitude of corporate issues,
including the duties of loyalty and care, contracts with interested directors, executive and director compensation, competition by a former director, and direct recovery in a derivative suit, it is an exciting event. This
article considers and evaluates all of these aspects of Lynch, but goes
somewhat further. As will be seen, this was a case which inter alia held
certain directors liable for breach of fiduciary duty. In the process, the
court considered certain provisions of the Wyoming Business Corporation Act,2 including section 17-1-136.1, which pertains to director conflicts
of interest, that is, contracts or transactions between a corporation and
*Professor of Law, University of Wyoming; B.A., Harvard, 1957; J.D., Harvard, 1960,
admitted to Bar, 1961, Pennsylvania; 1982, Wyoming.
I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Darlene Reiter and Richard Schneebeck
in the preparation of this article.
1. 701 P.2d 1126 (Wyo. 1985)
2. WYo. STAT. §§ 17-1-101 to -1011 (Supp. 1985).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1986

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 21 [1986], Iss. 1, Art. 10

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXI

one or more of its directors or any other corporation, firm, association
or entity in which one or more of its directors are directors or officers or
are financially interested.3 This article, however, considers the application of breach of fiduciary duty principles where certain procedures not
involved in Lynch, but contained in section 17-1-136.1, that is,
disinterested director votes or shareholder votes, are used to sanction conflict of interest contracts or transactions.
In the midst of reflection on such matters, almost irresistibly, a disturbing question keeps coming to the fore-whether contracts or transactions which engender conflict of interest problems are so beneficial or
necessary to corporate life and to social well-being that the path to their
consummation should be an easy one. Surely even the phrase "conflict
of interest" has negative connotations which have not subsided with the
passage of time. The law, however, has undergone considerable transformation in its willingness to permit contracts and transactions between
directors and their corporations. Further, as will be seen, some courts and
others continue to attempt to make conflict of interest contracts or transactions more likely to succeed where they are sanctioned by such devices
as so-called disinterested director or shareholder votes. This author has
too healthy a fear of such contracts or transactions and too little regard
for the efficacy of such devices to be convinced of the wisdom of such
efforts.
Coincidentally, this is a time in which the American Law Institute
(ALI) is engaged in the process of formulating principles of corporate
governance, a project which inter alia has included the preparation of a
tentative draft encompassing the "duty of loyalty." 4 This draft receives
considerable attention in this article. While judicial decisions which go
too far in watering down loyalty requirements in conflict of interest situations on the basis of so-called disinterested votes of directors or
shareholders are disturbing,5 the degree of acceptance which such dilution has found in Tentative Draft No. 3 of the ALI is appalling. Although
there may be decisions which improvidently reduce loyalty requirements,
it is, to say the least, premature for the ALI to magnify and sanctify such
positions. 6 It is not yet clear that dilution of loyalty trends have evolved
into firm national judicial positions deserving of great respect in the
3. WYO. STAT. § 17-1-136.1 (Supp. 1985).
4. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND

(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984) [hereinafter TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3]. Tentative
Draft No. 3 includes proposals relating to the duty of loyalty. For some background on the
RECOMMENDATIONS

American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, see Eisenberg, An Introduction to
the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 495
(1984). At the time of this writing, Tentative Draft No. 3 has not been submitted to the
American Law Institute membership for approval. Revisions of Tentative Draft No. 3 are
to be submitted to the Council of the American Law Institute, and a revised draft may be
submitted to the membership in May, 1986. Telephone interview with Marshall L. Small,
American Law Institute reportorial staff (August, 1985).
5. See infra notes 74 and 79 for examples of such cases.
6. See infra note 7 for further discussion.
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development of American Law.' Moreover, the work of the ALI, by its
own admission, is not simply a restatement of the law,8 but should be a
vehicle for more satisfactory development of the law with such objectives
as clarification, simplification and better adaptation to social needs.9 There
is no evidence that there has been any change in human nature to justify
anything but a legal climate fostering powerful inhibitions with respect
to conflict of interest transactions and the author is unconvinced for
reasons set forth in this article that safeguards represented by disinterested shareholder or disinterested director votes, as embraced by the tentative draft, are so protective of the interests of minority shareholders
or creditors as to relieve the courts of the need to maintain a careful
scrutiny of such transactions. It is hoped that courts will not be hasty
in surrendering their protective role and that the ALI will, by changing
certain positions in Tentative Draft No. 3 regarding loyalty, encourage
courts, state legislatures, and perhaps even Congress to be vigorous in
protecting against disloyalty.
7. Presently there are duty of loyalty statutes (sometimes referred to as "safe harbor
statutes") in many states. See infra text accompanying notes 42-44. Tentative Draft No.
3 admits that "there is considerable confusion in the cases as to the scope of judicial review
to be employed when testing the validity of a transaction between a director or senior executive and the corporation," and indicates that there is not yet a substantial body of caselaw
construing the statutes. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3 supra note 4, at 111, 131. For further discussion regarding the existing state of the law see E. BRODSKY & M.P. ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS §§ 3:05- :07 (1984) and 1 F.H. O'NEAL & R.B. THOMPSON,
O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 3.15, at 134-36 (2d ed. 1985). This article presents various arguments against unduly watering down loyalty requirements in conflict of interest cases because of disinterested director or shareholder votes. For example,
see the persuasive judicial arguments from older cases which could be contrasted sharply
with the positions embraced in Tentative Draft No. 3 which rely on the protective quality
of disinterested director votes as a reason for diluting or impairing loyalty requirements.
See, e.g., infra note 81.
8. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984), at vii-viii [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2]

in its foreword states:
Those who recall Tentative Draft No. 1 will note that the subtitle of the
project has been changed from "Restatement and Recommendations" to
"Analysis and Recommendations." The change was made to allay
the fear that
courts might be misled by the traditional word "Restatement" in the title to
view the entire document as purporting to restate existing law, ignoring the
detailed explanation in the Comments of how far that was and how far it was
not the case....
The present form "Analysis and Recommendations" makes clear, it is
believed, that all statements concerned with law should be regarded as recommendations of the Institute, with the context and the explanation in the Comment making clear how far a recommendation is believed to be consistent with
prevailing law and how far legal change is contemplated, and, if the latter,
whether by decision or by legislation.
9. Id at ix-x states in the foreword:
The fiery rhetoric aroused by Tentative Draft No. 1 included the assertion
that the Institute departed from its own tradition in going beyond restatement of existing law and making proposals as to what the law should be. Those
who put forward this critique are obviously misinformed as to the mission of
the Institute and its work product during more than half a century. The
Restatements, important as they are, never have been viewed as the exclusive
means for pursuit of our objectives: "the clarification and simplification of the
law and its better adaptation to social needs."
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While Lynch did not involve the impact of disinterested director or
shareholder votes, it will leave a bittersweet taste in the mouths of those
who favor strong deterrence against fiduciary misfeasance. Although in
some respects it speaks strongly in favor of fiduciary responsibility, in
other ways it undermines such responsibility.
Finally the Revised Model Business Corporation Act which was recently completed includes a section dealing with conflict of interest
transactions. 10 In light of the extensive analysis in this article of the corresponding Wyoming statutory section involving interested director transactions, and the likelihood of eventual legislative consideration of amendments based on the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, this article will comment on the revised section.
THE LYNCH CASE (FACTS)

In Lynch, a stockholder's derivative action was brought by Patterson, a minority stockholder of Lynch Consulting Services, Inc. (LCS), a
Wyoming corporation in the oil field consulting business, to recover
damages allegedly resulting from actions taken by its three directors in
violation of their fiduciary duties to the corporation. A counterclaim was
filed by the directors and LCS against Patterson alleging that he comduties as a former director by entering into
mitted a breach of fiduciary
2
competition with LCS.'

Patterson, a thirty percent owner of the voting stock of LCS, resigned
as director and officer of LCS on February 28, 1981, and formed his own
consulting company the next month. Two of the three defendant directors were Birl Lynch and R.C. Lynch (the Lynches) who each owned thirtyfive percent of the voting stock of LCS. The third defendant director was
Eunice Lynch (Eunice), the wife of one of the Lynches, and the mother
of the other. At a meeting of the board of directors of LCS, consisting
of the Lynches and Eunice, held on February 28, 1981, the compensation
of each of the Lynches was doubled to $8,000 per month. For the period
March 1, 1981 through December 1981, the Lynches received not only
the increased salaries, but also bonuses amounting to over $7,400 each.
At a meeting in January 1982, the directors voted to discontinue such
salaries and to hire Lynch Management Services (LMS), a partnership
composed of the Lynches, to manage LCS. The directors also agreed to
convene regularly and to pay the Lynches monthly director fees of $1,300
each.
In accordance with their management agreement, LCS paid LMS
$17,000 per month in management fees. LMS disbursed $16,000 of this
money in monthly salaries to the Lynches. While receiving these fees, LMS
sought business for itself as an oil-field consultant.
10.

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT §

8.31 (1985) [hereinafter

REVISED

MODEL ACT].

11. Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Wyo. 1985).

12. Id.
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In its first complete fiscal year under the management of LMS end-

ing April 30, 1983, LCS operated at a net loss of over $300,000 compared
to over $90,000 net earnings from operations during the previous fiscal
year. Further, by April 30, 1983, the liabilities of LCS exceeded its assets
by over $105,000 while one year earlier its net assets had amounted to
over $360,000. LMS, on the other hand, posted net earnings of over
$150,000 during its first year (January 1, 1982-December 31, 1982), and
its net assets increased from the partners' original contribution of $969
to over $11,000.
At board meetings in February and March, 1982, the directors of LCS
agreed to purchase property for which the corporation paid $85,000. Four
months later by unanimous vote of the directors, the property was sold
to the Lynches for $75,000.13
The district judge concluded that the Lynches, as directors of LCS,
were fiduciaries to Patterson. The Lynches were found to have engaged
in self-serving transactions with LCS and to have failed to establish the
fairness of their dealings.14 Further, the director fees, increased officer
salaries, management fees paid to LMS, and the benefit to the Lynches
from the sale of real property were found to constitute improper corporate
expenditures in the total amount of $266,000.15 The court held the Lynches
directly liable to Patterson for his pro rata share of such expenditures,
which the court calculated to be in the amount of $79,800, based on Patterson's thirty percent interest in the corporation. 16 The district court
Eunice and the defendants'
dismissed Patterson's claim against
17
counterclaim against Patterson.
DUTY OF LOYALTY TO THE CORPORATION

In challenging the findings of the trial court that the Lynches had
failed to establish the fairness to the corporation of management fees paid
to LMS and that the Lynches had not carried their burden of proof with

respect to the conveyance of the real estate to themselves at a loss to the
corporation of $10,000, the Lynches contended that a complaining
stockholder must establish fraud or unreasonableness in order to recover
damages from a director who enters into contracts with a corporation or
approves his own compensation. 8 The Lynches evidently wanted section
17-1-136. 1(a)(iii) 9 of the Wyoming Business Corporation Act 2 0 interpreted

in such a way as to require the plaintiff to establish the unreasonableness
of a challenged transaction.' Section 17-1-136.1(a) reads as follows:
13. Id. at 1128-29. All relevant facts are stated on these pages except for the fact that
Eunice Lynch was the mother of one of the directors, which appears on page 1137.
14. Id at 1129.
15. Id
16. Id
17. Id.
18. Id at 1131.
19. WYo. STAT. § 17-1-136.1 (Supp. 1985).
20. WYo. STAT. §§ 17-1-101 to -1011 (Supp. 1985).
21. Lynch, 701 P.2d at 1132.
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(a) No contract or other transaction between a corporation and
one (1) or more of its directors or any other corporation, firm,
association or entity in which one (1) or more of its directors are
directors or officers or are financially interested, shall be either
void or voidable because of the relationship or interest or because
the director or directors are present at the meeting of the board
of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or
ratifies the contract or transaction or because his or their votes
are counted for the purpose, if:
(i) The fact of the relationship or interest is disclosed or known
to the board of directors or committee which authorizes, approves
or ratifies the contract or transaction by a vote or consent sufficient for the purpose without counting the votes or consents of
the interested directors; or
(ii) The fact of the relationship or interest is disclosed or
known to the shareholders entitled to vote and they authorize, approve or ratify the contract or transaction by vote or written consent; or
(iii) The contract or transaction is fair and reasonable to the
corporation. 2
The Lynches did not argue that the transaction at issue here was
validated by virtue of subsections (a)(i) or (ii) but relied instead on subsection (iii) and the argument that the plaintiff had the burden of proof under
that subsection to establish the unreasonableness of the challenged
transaction. 3 The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected the contention of the
Lynches, holding that under subsection 17-1-136.1(a)(iii) "an interested
director, unable to rely on subparts (i) or (ii), bears the burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that a challenged transaction was fair
and reasonable to the corporation. 24 In reaching its conclusion the court
referred to prior cases from Wyoming and elsewhere 25 (which require a
challenged, interested director to prove that he acted in good faith and
that the contested transactions were fair to the corporation) and concluded
that the Wyoming Business Corporation Act does not dictate a contrary
result.2 The court buttressed its conclusion by referring to the principle

that "the fiduciary obligation of a director is a fundamental component
of the corporate structure,"

7

which "is embodied in § 17-1-133(b),

W.S. 1977, 1984 Cum.Supp., which imposes upon directors the affirmative
duties of good faith, loyalty and care."28 The court took the position that
"the very nature of these fiduciary standards of conduct demands that
a challenged director bear the burden of establishing that a contract under
which he benefits also serves the best interests of the corporation. 29 The
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

§ 17-1-136.1 (Supp. 1985).
Lynch, 701 P.2d at 1132.
Id.
IM at 1131. The cases referred to are those cited infra notes 30, 41.
Lynch, 701 P.2d at 1131.
Id. at 1132.
Id
Id.
WYO. STAT.
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court described the fiduciary obligations of corporate directors and majority shareholders as follows:
[t]heir dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous
scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with
the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or
stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction
but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the
corporation and those interested therein .... The essence of the
test is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction

carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain. If it does not,
equity will set it aside.''30

Applying the rule that the interested director bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a challenged transaction was
fair and reasonable to the corporation under section 17-1-136.1(a)(iii), the
Lynch court concluded that the evidence supported the factual findings
of the trial court regarding the management fees 31 and the transfer of real
estate.2
The position of the Supreme Court of Wyoming regarding burden of
proof is correct. It is quite appropriate to interpret section 17-1-136.1,
which involves director conflict of interest transactions, with the historic
and important fiduciary duty of loyalty in mind. 3 The principle that the
director has fiduciary duties to the corporation including the duty of loyalty in conflict of interest situations is well established:
Corporate managerial powers, being powers in trust, must be exercised honestly and in good faith. The director or officer
"owes loyalty and allegiance to the corporation-a loyalty that
is undivided and an allegiance that is influenced in action by no
consideration other than the welfare of the corporation. Any
adverse interest of a director will be subjected to a scrutiny rigid
and uncompromising. He may not profit at the expense of his corporation and in conflict with its rights; he may not for personal
gain divert unto himself the opportunities which in equity and
fairness belong to his corporation. He is required to use his independent judgment. In the discharge of his duties3 a4 director
must, of course, act honestly and in good faith ....

30. Id at 1131 (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939)).
31. Lynch, 701 P.2d at 1133.
32. Id.
33. This article is written from the perspective of analyzing the liability of interested
directors in conflict of interest transactions because the Lynch case is written from that
perspective and because Section 17-1-136.1 is written in terms of such transactions. It is
recognized that theories of corporate loyalty pertinent to corporate officers and majority
shareholders, as such, may also be worthy of exploration in connection with Lynch and certain other cases involving conflict of interest transactions. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra
note 4, § 5.08, which is discussed in this article from the director perspective, also specifically deals with certain corporate officers, and Section 5.14 deals with dominating shareholder
transactions with the corporation.
34. H. HENN AND J. ALEXANDER, HORNBOOK OF THE LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BusINEss ENTERPRISES § 235, at 626 (3d ed. 1983) (quoting Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d
667, 677-78 (1940)).
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The significance of the duty of loyalty in discerning legislative intent under
section 136.1 is increased because such a duty is also imposed by the
legislature in Section 133(b), a section which, as indicated, did not go un35
noticed by the Wyoming Supreme Court.
The Requirement of Fairness to the Corporation
There was a time when the general common law rule was that any
transaction or contract between a corporation and a director was voidable
by the corporation.3 6 Such a rule deters disloyalty effectively by the extreme device of rendering self-dealing transactions or contracts completely
vulnerable. There is, of course, good reason for courts to be concerned
about such transactions or contracts since they may be used by those in
power to take advantage of those out of power, such as minority
shareholders or corporate creditors.3 7 It came to be recognized, however,
that such transactions or contracts may be beneficial to corporations and
should not be automatically voidable.3

The modern rule which has

developed would render them voidable "on the basis of the conflicting interest plus the additional factor of unfairness to the corporation ' 39 with
the burden of proving their fairness on those who would sustain them.
Fairness is tested on the basis of whether an independent fiduciary would40
bind the corporation to such a transaction in an arm's length bargain.
35. Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 1132 (Wyo. 1985). The phrase "best interests
of the corporation" appears in section 133(b) as well as in the Model Business Corporation
Act Section 35. The Corporate Director's Guidebook refers to the phrase "best interests of
the corporation" as "that component of the duty of loyalty involving the corporate director's primary allegiance. As the shareholders' designee, the corporate director is in a position of stewardship for the owners of the enterprise, whose interests are interchangeably
merged with the interests of the corporate entity." American Bar Association, Section of
Corporation,Banking and Business Law, Committee on CorporateLaws, CorporateDirector's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1601 (1978) [hereinafter CorporateDirector's Guidebook].
36. Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions:A
WateringDown of FiduciaryStandards?,53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 201, 202 (1977); Marsh, Are
DirectorsTrustees? Conflict of Interestand CorporateMorality, 22 Bus. LAW 35, 36-39 (1966);
E. BRODSKY & M.P. ADAMSKI, supra note 7, § 3:01, at 1.
37. See Marsh, supra note 36, at 35-39 (a collection of judicial comments on the dangers
and disadvantages to the corporation which arise from conflict of interest transactions). Some
of these comments are quoted infra note 81.
38. E. BRODSKY & M.P. ADAMSKI, supra note 7, § 3:01, at 2, state:
In recognition of the prevalence of interlocking directorates, and because
of the belief that certain transactions between the corporation and its directors, or between the corporation and another corporation in which one or more
of its directors had an interest, might be beneficial to the corporation, the rule
of strict voidability was gradually repudiated.
The merits of the abolition of strict voidability are debatable. See infra note 81; Brudney,
The Independent Director-HeavenlyCity orPotemkin Village?, 95 HARV.L. REV. 597 (1982).
39. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 34, § 238, at 639, in discussing conflict of
interest transactions, state:
There is a three-way split of authority as to whether such a transaction
is voidable on the basis of the conflicting interest alone, on the basis of the
conflicting interest plus the additional element of fraud or bad faith, or on the
basis of the conflicting interest plus the additional factor of unfairness to the
corporation. The more modern cases tend to apply the "fairness" test: Would
an independent corporate fiduciary in an arm's length bargain bind the corporation to such a transaction?
40. Id.at 639-40.
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cases placed the burden of showing
As indicated above, earlier Wyoming
4
fairness on the interested director. '

Furthermore, a number of states including Wyoming enacted statutory provisions like section 136.142 which have been referred to as safe
harbor statutes4 3 and provide that no contract or transaction between a
corporation and one or more of its directors shall be either void or voidable
because of the relationship or interest of the director if one of several con-

ditions is met.44 In enacting such a statutory provision, Wyoming was
following the approach of Model Business Corporation Act section 414"
which states its limited objective as: "contracts or transactions involving an interested director will not be void or voidable solely because of
all other respects
the director's interest if certain conditions are met. ' In
46
"
equitable principles will continue to be applicable.
It is one thing to adopt a statute which eliminates or codifies the
elimination of a rigid voidability rule. It is quite another matter to broadly construe such a statute beyond its limited objective so as to weaken
the position of shareholders or creditors by implying that the statute
changes the burden of proof which a court would normally apply in a case
alleging fiduciary misconduct and testing the fairness and reasonableness
of a contract or transaction. In light of the very real dangers posed by
a conflict of interest,4 7 directors on both sides of a transaction such as
those in the Lynch case should have the burden of proving its fairness.
Moreover, the interested director is generally more knowledgeable about
the corporate transaction in which he is involved than would be the minority shareholder or creditor who must be protected. Placing the burden on
the interested director is, therefore, sensible. The historic and continuing
recognition in cases and other statutory sections that directors, as
4 8
fiduciaries, owe a duty of loyalty to the corporation along with the practical policy considerations calling for adequate protection of the corporation, its minority shareholders, and creditors suggest that it would be improper to construe statutory sections like section 136.1 to undermine the
recognized fiduciary duty of loyalty beyond what their limited objective
and express language mandate. Indeed, a proper regard for the duty of
41. See supra text accompanying note 25. The earlier cases cited in the Lynch case are:
Voss Oil Co. v. Voss, 367 P.2d 977, 979 (Wyo. 1962); Nicholson v. Kingery, 37 Wyo. 299,
261 P. 122 (1927).
42. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.34 (Cum. Supp. 1985); NEBR. REV. STATE §
21-2040.01 (1983). TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 5.08 reporter's note at 129-32,
discusses similarities and differences in various state approaches.
43. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 5.08, reporter's note at 129.
44. Id at 129-32. For example, the Iowa and Nebraska statutory sections cited supra
note 42 set forth the same conditions as those in Wyoming section 17-1-136.1(a). See supra
text accompanying note 22.
45. MODEL BusINESS CORP. ACT § 41 (1979) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. This section is
almost identical to the Wyoming statutory provision. The Wyoming Business Corporation
Act is based on the Model Act. True v. High-Plains Elevator Machinery, Inc., 577 P.2d 991,
1000 (Wyo. 1978). It contains significant variations from the Model Act, however.
46. MODEL ACT supra note 45, § 41 comment 2, at 842.
47. See Marsh, supra note 36, at 35-39. See also infra note 81.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30, 34-35.
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loyalty and for the policy considerations also justifies a court decision to
place the burdens of production and persuasion regarding the fairness
issue on the interested director in a case like Lynch.
Section 136.1 and similar safe harbor statutes of other states 9 raise
various questions of interpretation which the Wyoming court did not have
to reach. It may be argued that, literally, section 136.1 validates a contract without regard to fairness or that it places the burden of proving
unfairness on a complaining party if either of the other statutory conditions, that is, those referring to disinterested director approval 0 or
shareholder approval," are satisfied. Arguments, however, which attribute
such significance to section 136.1 are not very persuasive. The factors
discussed above which call for a narrow reading of section 136.1, along
with a reading which does not unduly undermine the fiduciary duty of
loyalty, militate against construing that section to eliminate judicial
scrutiny of the fairness issue or to affect the burden of proof regarding
that issue. A reading which attributes too much significance to subsections (i) and (ii) would be unfortunate and unreasonable. This is illustrated
vividly by the impact such a construction would confer on interested
shareholder votes of approval.
ShareholderApproval
Suppose there was shareholder approval in Lynch because the Lynches
as majority shareholders voted in favor of the transactions in which they
had an interest. There is nothing in the language of subsection (ii) which
indicates that the majority vote must be disinterested. Indeed, in light
of the contrast in language between subsection (ii) and subsection (i),which
specifically refers to a vote by disinterested directors, it could be argued
that subsection (ii) contemplates a vote by interested shareholders. A vote
by interested shareholders such as the Lynches should not immunize a
transaction from scrutiny as to fairness or be the reason for relieving the
defendant of the burden of proving the fairness of a contract or transaction. It seems absurd to say that the legislature intended to preclude the
court from examining the fairness of a contract or transaction or to relieve
interested parties of their burden of proof in a conflict of interest situation simply because interested shareholders cast enough shareholder votes
to approve the contract or transaction. The corporation and its minority
shareholders and creditors would be left without protection against unfairness by a statutory interpretation which precludes judicial inquiry into
that question. A complaining party would be relegated to attacks on a
transaction based on theories much more difficult to sustain, such as
waste,"2 to the extent that such other theories would be deemed viable
49. See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 5.08, reporter's note at 129-30, 134-37.
For a list of states with safe harbor statutes see also supra note 42.

§ 17-1-136.1(a)(i) (Supp. 1985).
51. Id.§ 17-1-136.1(a)(i).
52. See infra text accompanying note 66 for the meaning and a discussion of the term
"waste" as used here.
50. WYO. STAT.
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in the face of an expansive interpretation of the immunity afforded by
the language of section 136.1. 51
In addition, even if fairness itself is subject to judicial scrutiny, protection to the complaining party would be greatly and irrationally reduced
by a statutory interpretation placing the burden of proving unfairness
on him simply because of an interested shareholder vote which affords
him no added protection. In a Delaware decision cited by the Wyoming
Supreme Court in Lynch, 54 the court narrowly interpreted a similar
statutory provision involving ratification by the shareholders of an interested transaction. The court concluded that the statute did not provide broad immunity for defendants but merely removed an "interested
director" cloud when its terms were met. The statute provided against
invalidation of an agreement "solely" because such a director or officer
is involved.5 5 The Delaware Court pointed out that "[n]othing in the statute
sanctions unfairness to [the corporation] or removes the transaction from
judicial scrutiny."5 6 Moreover, the Delaware court rejected the argument
that the defendants had been relieved of the burden of proving fairness
by reason of the shareholder ratification because the ratification was not
given by a majority of independent or disinterested shareholders. 57
Interpretation of the statute as precluding a judicial inquiry regarding fairness or affecting the burden of proof on that question even where
a contract or transaction is approved by a disinterested shareholder vote
would be unreasonable because the statutory language does not differentiate between an interested and disinterested shareholder vote. Nor does
subsection (i) of section 136.1(a) mandate any approach as to judicial consideration of the fairness of a transaction or burden of proof where a
disinterested director vote approving the transaction has been obtained
since, in view of the language of section 136.1(a), it would be difficult to
give greater effect to subsection (i) than to subsection (ii).
Even if not compelled to do so by statute, however, a court must face
the question of whether, as a matter of judicial lawmaking, a disinterested
shareholder or disinterested director vote of approval shifts the burden
of proof on the fairness issue, eliminates the need for a judicial inquiry
regarding fairness, or reduces the level of judicial scrutiny to be applied
to a transaction. Tentative Draft No. 358 takes the position that in the
53. One could take the very extreme position that satisfying any of the conditions of
section 136.1 would validate a transaction against any or almost any legal attack. Such a
position seems untenable. For example, it seems inconceivable that a court would automatically sustain a transaction under that section if fraud were used to obtain a vote of approval
by the disinterested directors or shareholders-or if corporate waste was involved.
54. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976). While the Delaware statutory section involved in Fliegler differs in some respects from Wyoming Section 136.1, the perspective of the Delaware court, as explained in the text accompanying this note and note 55,
infra, may reasonably be applied to the Wyoming section. A similar perspective is found
in Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini, 109 Cal.2d 401, 241 P.2d 66 (Cal. 1952).
55. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976).
56. Id
57. Id at 221.
58. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 5.08 (a)(2).
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absence of a disinterested shareholder or disinterested director vote, or
a corporate standard (adopted by disinterested directors or disinterested
shareholders) permitting a transaction, 9 a director violates the duty of
loyalty owed to the corporation if the transaction was not fair to it.6° Further, the burden of proving fairness in such cases is on the director. 6' The
Draft explains:
In determining whether to enter into a transaction, the corporate decisionmaker who approves the transaction should consider not only whether the transaction will be "fair" to the corporation as measured by comparison with an arm's-length transaction with an unrelated party, but whether the transaction affirmatively will be in the corporation's
best interest, as in a trans62
action with an unrelated party.
The Draft further indicates that the burden will be on the director to prove
the transaction is in fact fair, rather than whether a6 3corporate decisionmaker could reasonably have believed it to be fair.
The Draft calls for a completely different approach if a transaction
was authorized or ratified by a disinterested shareholder vote following
proper disclosure to the shareholders, however. In such a case the interested director will violate his duty of loyalty to the corporation only
if the transaction constitutes a waste of corporate assets, 64 and the burden
of proving such waste is on the challenging party.65 The Draft essentially
adopts the position that "to prove waste of corporate assets, a party must
show that no person of ordinary sound business judgment would say that
the consideration received by the corporation was a fair exchange for what
was given by the corporation."6 6 Of course, disclosure by the director in
connection with authorization or ratification is important, and he owes
a duty to the corporation not only to avoid misleading it by misstatements
or omissions, but to disclose affirmatively the material facts concerning
a transaction in which he has a personal interest.6 7
Admittedly, there is judicial authority which favors a shift in burden
of proof to the complaining party or a dilution of the fairness standard
59. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 8, § 1.27, defines the term "corporate standard" as follows: " 'Standard of the Corporation' means a valid certificate or by-law provision, or board or shareholder resolution, regulating corporate governance." TENTATIVE DRAFT
No. 3, supra note 4, § 5.08 (a)(2)(C) indicates that the corporate standard must be adopted
in accordance with section 5.06, which calls for disinterested director or shareholder action.

60. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 5.08 (a)(2).
61. Id § 5.08(b).
62. Id § 5.08(a)(2)(C) comment at 123-24.
63. Id at 123.
64. Id § 5.08(a)(2)(B).
65. Id § 5.08(b).
66. Id § 5.08(a)(2)(B) comment at 122. Waste is defined in Tentative Draft No. 2 as
follows: "A 'waste of corporate assets' means a transaction whose terms are such that no
person of ordinary sound business judgment would say that the consideration received by

the corporation was a fair exchange for what was given by the corporation." TENTATIVE
No. 2, supra note 8, § 1.30.
67. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 5.08(a)(2)(B) comment at 115.
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68
based on disinterested shareholder approval. A majority vote of disinterested shareholders would arguably give some protection to those who
need it. It may be said that disinterested shareholder approval furnishes
at least some objectivity in the consideration and approval of a transaction or contract. The protection may be illusory, however, because the protective impact of a disinterested shareholder vote depends on various factors such as the extent of information readily available to such shareto apply to
holders, the degree of diligence Which they could be expected
69 and the use
the rendering of a wise decision based on such information,
of a reasonable test and procedure for classifying shareholders as in0
terested or disinterested. Moreover, the shareholder vote does not
substitute for the protection afforded by a bargaining process leading to
a true arms length agreement-a process which would be present in the
usual non-conflict of interest situation." Since the degree of protection
afforded by a so-called disinterested shareholder vote may under the circumstances be uncertain or debatable, shifting the burden of proof regarding fairness should not be automatic or lightly sanctioned. Rather, it
should depend on the development and application of adequate judicial
safeguards regarding the sufficiency of the protective quality of the vote.
A fortioriwithdrawing the fairness issue from judicial scrutiny, or reducing the level of that scrutiny because of a so-called disinterested shareholder vote is even more questionable.

It is true that it would be desirable on some occasions to encourage
the submission of conflict of interest transactions to a shareholder vote2
even where corporate statutory law does not require such a procedure."
68. See, e.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979).
69. In a large public corporation, it seems unrealistic to expect the kind of consideraof
tion of proposals made through the proxy solicitation process which will be protective
No. 2, supra note
the corporation's minority shareholders and creditors. TENTATIVE DRAFT
effec8, at 54, states: "Direct review by the body of shareholders, however, while perhaps of
the
because
corporations,
held
publicly
in
efficacious
seldom
is
tive in close corporations,
disparate and shifting nature of the shareholder body and the complexity of modem management issues." One wonders why the statement from Tentative Draft No. 2 did not influence
the drafters of Tentative Draft No. 3, who placed so much reliance on disinterested shareholder
approval.

as
70. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 8, § 1.15 defines interested shareholder

follows: "(2) A shareholder is interested in a transaction if either the shareholder or, to his
is
knowledge, an associate of the shareholder, is a party to the transaction." An associate

defined in Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 4, § 5.01 as:
(1) A spouse, child, parent, or sibling of a director [§ 1.081 or of a senior
executive I§ 1.25] or of a shareholder, or
(2) Any person J§ 1.201 for whom a director, senior executive, or shareholder
has financial responsibility, or with whom he has a business relationship that
is sufficiently substantial that it would reasonably be expected to affect his
judgment with respect to the transaction in question in a manner adverse to
the corporation.
which is reThis definition may not be broad enough to insure the objectivity of the voter
and
interest
of
question
the
event,
any
In
protective.
approval
of
vote
quired to make the
may
a procedure for determination of interest where there are large numbers of shareholders
7-9.
be vexing indeed. See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 8, § 1.15 comment at
71. Marsh, supra note 36, at 49.
72. Express statuory provisions recognize that certain transactions such as mergers
1985)
must be approved by shareholder vote. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. § 17-1-403 (Supp.
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While one may quite properly be skeptical about the adequacy of the consideration which the shareholders would give to the proposed transaction,
the resultant disclosure would at least be healthy and encourage fair play.
Conceivably, statutes could be revised to require all conflict of interest
transactions to have shareholder approval, but that would prove to be
too cumbersome and expensive in some situations. Short of such a blanket
requirement, the disinterested shareholder approval process could be encouraged by giving interested directors some advantage as against potential complaining parties, provided that material disclosures have been
properly made in obtaining shareholder approval. A shift in the burden
of proof to the complaining party would confer such an advantage on the
interested director. But to go further and eliminate or modify the fairness
requirement regarding the contract or transaction because of a disinterested shareholder vote means saddling a corporation with a transaction
or contract with an interested director which a complaining party can
prove to be unfair.
The position, therefore, of the Draft73 and some courts 4 which supports the dilution of fiduciary responsibility by lowering or eliminating
the fairness requirement and using instead a waste requirement in the
presence of a disinterested shareholder vote furnishes a fiduciary with
more of an advantage vis-a-vis his corporation than is appropriate. Such
a fiduciary should not win a case in which a complaining party is able to
meet the burden of proving that the fiduciary has engaged in a transaction which is unfair to the corporation. Public policy simply should not
favor such a result. When a director considers entering into a conflict of
interest transaction, he should fix his attention on the question of its
fairness in a most sober way. The Corporate Director's Guidebook suggests:
When conflicting interests are present, the corporate director must
be concerned that fairness obligations are recognized and satisfied.
If a transaction by a director with the corporation involves a possible conflict of interest, its fairness to the corporation should be
a primary concern for both the interested director and those disinterested directors entertaining a request for favorable action. 5
Director concern about fairness should not be relieved because of an upcoming shareholder vote. The prospect of a shareholder vote should not
lead to director complacency regarding the fairness of a transaction.
Arguably, a middle ground may be appropriate: in those cases in which
a court finds a disinterested shareholder vote exceptionally protective of
the corporate interest, then, in addition to a shift in burden of proof to
the complaining party, the shareholder vote should be considered as
73. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 5.08 (a)(2)(B).
74. See, e.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979).
75. CorporateDirector's Guidebook, supra note 35, at 1599.
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evidence of fairness.16 In the usual situation where there is appropriate
disclosure to disinterested shareholders but no special reason to assign
unusual protective significance to the vote, the burden of proof may be
placed on the complaining party but the fairness of the transaction should
remain at issue and be unaffected by the disinterested shareholder vote.
The problem with such a middle ground is that it may at times get a court
involved with complex hairsplitting decisions (as to whether a shareholder
vote is unusually protective) in order to increase the burden on a complaining party to show unfairness, a burden which is difficult enough as
it is.
Finally, it may be argued that in the presence of a properly informed
unanimous shareholder ratification, a conflict of interest transaction
should be unassailable on grounds of fairness, waste, or otherwise. One
problem with such a position is that it fails to adequately protect corporate
creditors. Moreover, even a unanimous shareholder vote may in some contexts furnish little actual protection to those who have voted to approve
because of their ignorance or inattention.
DisinterestedDirectorApproval
Whether or to what extent a disinterested director vote should alter
in any way the judicial inquiry into fairness raises a number of issues.
Tentative Draft No. 3 takes the position that in a case involving an alleged violation of the director's duty of loyalty, if a transaction was authorized in advance by disinterested directors following appropriate disclosure, the challenging party will have the burden of proving that the
disinterested directors could not reasonably have believed the transaction to be fair to the corporation. 7 The Draft explains that this represents
a level of judicial scrutiny more intense than that used under the business
judgment rule but less intense than that required if there had been no
disinterested director or shareholder approval.78 Admittedly, there is
judicial authority which favors a shift in the burden of proof to the complaining party and a dilution of the fairness standard or even elimination
76. Perhaps in the close corporation context a favorable disinterested shareholder vote
would have a better chance of being viewed as exceptionally protective because the
shareholders may be closer to the situation than they would be in the public corporation
context. See supra note 69.
77. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 5.08 (a)(2)(A).

78. Id comment at 119. That comment states:
If a transaction has been authorized in advance by disinterested directors,
the burden of proof will be on the party challenging the transaction under §
5.02(a) (2)(A), but a somewhat more intense level of judicial scrutiny than the
rational basis test required under the business judgment rule (and a somewhat
less intense level of scrutiny than that required if there has been no disinterested
director or shareholder approval) is to be applied-namely, whether the directors who approved the transaction could not reasonably have believed the transaction to be fair.
See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985) for a discussion of the duty of care and
the business judgment rule.
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of that standard based on disinterested director approval."9 The disinterested director vote would arguably give some protection to those who
need it. As in the case of the disinterested shareholder vote, such a vote
may furnish a measure of objectivity in the consideration and approval
of a transaction or contract. It may or may not render the bargaining process relative to the transaction or contract close to or the same as that
which would obtain in an arms length situation.
As in the case of a disinterested shareholder vote, though, the degree
of protection provided by a disinterested director vote is questionable and
will vary with each case. Defining what is disinterested, 0 and overcoming problems of favoritism 8 l present formidable difficulties. To counter
the evils of self-dealing, the independent director must assume an adversarial role in the particular transaction."2 Several factors often undermine
such a role, however, such as psychological and social pressures,"3 limited
incentives to perform such a role 4 and weak sanctions for failure to rightly
perform.8 5 In addition, variations in the extent of disclosure to directors
79. See, e.g., Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971).
80. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 8, § 1.15, defines "interested director" as follows:
(1) A director [§ 1.08] or officer [§ 1.19] is "interested" in a transaction if:
(a) the director or officer is a party to the transaction, or
(b) the director or officer or an associate 1§ 5.01] of the director has a
pecuniary interest in the transaction, or the director or officer has a financial
or familial relationship to a party to the transaction, that is sufficiently substantial that it would reasonably be expected to affect the director's or officer's
judgment with respect to the transaction in a manner adverse to the corporation.
For the definition of the term "associate" see supra, note 70.
81. Marsh, supra note 36, at 37 summarizes judicial views regarding problems, including
favoritism, in relying on so-called disinterested director approval as follows:
The courts stated that the corporation was entitled to the unprejudiced
judgment and advice of all of its directors and therefore it did no good to say
that the interested director did not participate in the making of the contract
on behalf of the corporation.

82.
83.
84.
85.

"...

the very words in which he asserts his right

declare his wrong; he ought to have participated.... "Furthermore, the courts
said that it was impossible to measure the influence which one director might
have over his associates, even though ostensibly abstaining from participation in the discussion or vote. "... a corporation, in order to defeat a contract
entered into by directors, in which one or more of them had a private interest,
is not bound to show that the influence of the director or directors having the
private interest determined the action of the board. The law cannot accurately measure the influence of a trustee with his associates, nor will it enter into
the inquiry ..
"
Perhaps the strongest reason for this inflexibility of the law was given
by the Maryland Supreme Court which stated that, when a contract is made
with even one of the directors, "the remaining directors are placed in the embarrassing and invidious position of having to pass upon, scrutinize and check
the transactions and accounts of one of their own body, with whom they are
associated on terms of equality in the general management of all the affairs
of the corporation." Or, as Justice Davies of the New York Supreme Court
expressed the same thought: "The moment the directors permit one or more
of their number to deal with the property of the stockholders, they surrender
their own independence and self control." (citations omitted).
Brudney, supra note 38, at 610.
Id at 610-13.
Id. at 613-14.
Id at 614-16.
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and in the effort expended by them to consider a matter render their pro-

tective role somewhat uncertain.86
The weakness of reliance on directors for protection is illustrated by
the lack of effort shown in the recent case of Smith v. Van Gorkom.87 In
that case, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a group of sophisticated
directors had breached their fiduciary duty by failing to ascertain readily
available valuation information which was relevant to their decision to
recommend a merger. The court found that the board acted without information adequate to reach an informed business judgment as to the
fairness of a $55 per share selling price of the corporation. 8 Casting further doubt on the reliability of independent directors, one commentator,
who examined the experience that those directors have had in the role
of enforcing fairness standards concluded: "To be sure, the available
evidence does not demonstrate systematic malfunction by the independent director. On the other hand, no evidence thus far available reveals
effective functioning in this role." 89
Serious questions, therefore, must be raised about watering down a
requirement of fairness and shifting the burden of proof of fairness simply because so-called disinterested directors have approved a transaction.
It is true that it would be desirable at times to encourage the submission
of a conflict of interest transaction to a disinterested director vote. This
may lead to healthy disclosure and bargaining. In light of the potential
for abuse or inadequate protection even with the approval of the disinterested directors, however, it is not too much to place the burden of proof
on the interested director unless the court, operating from a perspective
of healthy skepticism, is satisfied that the disinterested director vote
reflects at least a considerable measure of objectivity and genuine protection of the corporate interest.9 0 Moreover, as a general rule, a director
simply should not be able to sustain the validity of a contract which is
unfair to his corporation even where his co-directors have approved it.
Perhaps, if the court can conclude that the disinterested director vote has
afforded as much protection as arms length bargaining, the vote should
be considered as evidence of fairness. Even in cases in which a court would
shift the burden of proof to a complaining party, however, the latter should
be able to prevail by proving the unfairness of the transaction with the
interested director.
86. See id at 609. Profess Brudney states:
Since the governing rules validate the independent director's approval of selfdealing or self-aggrandizing transactions only if the relevant information is
disclosed to, or known by the director, there should be little difficulty for the
independent director in obtaining information about the transaction. However,
for the many judgments that turn on comparative data, the task is likely to
require time and effort. Presumably, staff assistance would aid the directors.
Even with that assistance, however, the demands of such monitoring are not
insignificant, especially for directors who, for the most part, appear to be engaged principally in other activities. (footnotes omitted)
87. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
88. Id, at 874.
89. Brudney, supra note 38, at 616.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72 for a similar approach in cases where there
is a disinterested shareholder vote.
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Analysis of Lynch v. Patterson
On the facts of Lynch, where there was no claim of disinterested approval by shareholders or directors, the Wyoming court was correct not
only in placing the burden of proof on the interested directors, but also
in insisting that this burden be met with clear and convincing evidence
that the challenged transaction was fair and reasonable to the corporation. 91 The clear and convincing standard was explained in language quoted
from earlier cases:
When the evidence is such that the mind readily reaches a satisfactory conclusion as to the existence or nonexistence of a fact in dis91
pute, then the evidence is, of necessity, clear and satisfactory ....
We further had said that clear and convincing evidence is "that
kind of proof which would persuade a trier of fact that the truth
of the contention is highly probable." 93
The court pointed to the evidence that the Lynches hired their own partnership, LMS, to manage the corporation, 94 the partnership drew $17,000
per month in management fees 9 5 and took consulting jobs for itself which
otherwise would have gone to the corporation, 96 and, finally, that the corporation operated at a loss under this arrangement while the management
company showed a profit.97 The court stated that the only justification
presented at trial for this agreement was that it provided advantages for
cash flow and tax planning.99 In the face of this evidence, the court held
that the factual finding of the trial court that the Lynches had failed to
establish the fairness to the corporation of management fees in excess
of $9,000 per month was adequately supported by the evidence.9 9 The court
also sustained the trial court's conclusion that the Lynches failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence the fairness of the conveyance of property to themselves at a loss to the corporation of $10,000.100
Conclusion
In the case of self-dealing where little or no protection for the corporation, minority shareholders, or creditors exists in the checks and balances
of the corporate governmental structure, it is appropriate to lay a heavy
burden of proof on interested parties with regard to the issue of fairness.
It is true that at times this approach may yield too much of a strategic
edge to a minority shareholder who is being unreasonable or spiteful, or
is improperly using a particular transaction as a wedge to obtain some
91. Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 1132.
92. Id. (quoting Thomasi v. Koch, 660 P.2d 806, 811 (Wyo. 1983)) (citations omitted).
93. Lynch, 701 P.2d at 1132 (quoting Thomasi v. Koch, 660 P.2d 806, 811 (Wyo. 1983))
(citations omitted).
94. Lynch, 701 P.2d at 1132-33.
95. Id
96. Id
97. Id
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id
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concession.10' It may even result in the loss to the corporation of the
benefits of a transaction because of apprehension of the interested directors about potential litigation. Where, however, the potential for taking
unfair advantage of a corporation, its minority shareholders and its
creditors is great, as in Lynch, placement of the burden of showing fairness
by clear and convincing evidence on the interested parties is appropriate. 0
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND DIRECTOR'S FEES

The Lynch Case
Lynch dealt with the question of executive compensation and director fees separately from that of the other interested transactions.'03 The
court alluded to the judicial reluctance to inquire into the reasonableness
of executive compensation fixed by a disinterested board."' It noted the
existence of a stricter standard when a recipient sets his own
compensation, °5 however, and pointed to the burden which falls on the
director to prove the reasonableness of challenged compensation which
he has set. 0 6 The court listed several factors which have been established
in considering whether a defendant has met his burden with respect to
the reasonableness of his fee or salary as follows:
These criteria include the recipient's ability, services and time
devoted to the company, the size and complexities of the business,
success achieved, corporate earnings and profits, increase in
volume or quality of business, the prevailing general economic conditions, a comparison of salaries with distributions to stockholders,
compensation for comparable positions in comparable concerns,
and the amount previously received as salary.' 0 7
The court concluded that for both director and executive salaries the
evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that the defendants had
failed to establish the reasonableness of the compensation.' 8
While the court placed the burden on the interested directors to prove
the reasonableness of the compensation, it refrained from analyzing the
problem in terms of section 136.1, using the word "fairness," or referring
to the "clear and convincing" standard utilized in connection with the
other interested transactions. Whether such omissions are significant or
101. Thus, in a close corporation setting, one can envision certain minority shareholders

withholding approval of an interested transaction because of base motives of their own.
102. Oberhelman v. Barnes Inv. Corp., 236 Kan. 335, 690 P.2d 1343 (1984) (citing Newton
v. Hornblower, Inc., 224 Kan. 506, 582 P.2d 1136, Syl. para. 9 (1978)). That court stated:
"Where the fairness of a fiduciary transaction is challenged, the burden of proof is upon
the fiduciary to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence that such transaction was fair and
done in good faith."
103. Lynch, 701 P.2d at 1133.
104. Id.
105. Id
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1133-35.
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inadvertent is unclear. Perhaps the court sought to place some distance
between the analysis of compensation issues and other interested transaction issues. Nor is it clear whether any significance was intended by
the court in considering compensation in terms of "reasonableness" alone
rather than in terms of fairness and reasonableness. It may be that a
fairness test requires a higher standard of fiduciary behavior than a
reasonableness test. Perhaps the omission of any reference to the "clear
and convincing" standard indicates a reluctance by the court to decide
if that standard must be used in a compensation case where, because of
the facts, the liability of a director may be determined without employing such a strict standard.
Arguably, the judicial scrutiny of compensation arrangements should
be less intense or the burden of proof less onerous than that required in
most other interested transactions, since the latter can be avoided while
compensation arrangements with directors as such and as officers or
10 9
courts enemployees are often necessary. Because of the difficulties
0 the frequencompensation,1
of
counter in determining the reasonableness
cy of such interested director transactions, and the potentially disruptive
effects of litigation on corporate and judicial operations, courts may want
to avoid a flood of cases casting them in the role of super boards of directors to check on the reasonableness of corporate compensation. They may
not want to encourage such litigation by making it too easy for plaintiffs
to win such cases. While the burden of proof should be placed on the interested parties who set the compensation, piling the clear and convincing standard on top of that may be just a little too much. In any event,
it would be well for parties in a close corporation, through prior planning,
109. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 5.09 comment c, at 143 states" .. unlike
most other self-interested transactions-which may be foregone, since the corporation usually
need not deal with the director or senior executive-compensation arrangements with directors and senior executives are necessary in all cases."
110. The difficulties are evident from the court's words in Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d
653, 679-80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 263 A.D. 814, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1941):
Yes, the Court possesses the power to prune these payments, but open-

ness forces the confession that the pruning would be synthetic and artificial
rather than analytic or scientific. Whether or not it would be fair and just, is

highly dubious. Yet, merely because the problem is perplexing is no reason
for eschewing it. It is not timidity, however, which perturbs me. It is finding
a rational or just gauge for revising these figures were I inclined to do so. No
blueprints are furnished. The elements to be weighed are incalculable; the im-

ponderables, manifold. To act out of whimsy or caprice or arbitrariness would
be more than inexact-it would be the precise antithesis of justice; it would

be a farce.

If comparisons are to be made, with whose compensation are they to be
made-executives? Those connected with the motion picture industry? Radio

artists? Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States? The President

of the United States? Manifestly, the material at hand is not of adequate
plasticity for fashioning into a pattern or standard. Many instances of positive
underpayment will come to mind, just as instances of apparent rank overpay-

ment abound ....

Courts are ill-equipped to solve or even to grapple with these entangled
economic problems. Indeed, their solution is not within the juridical province.

(emphasis in original)
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to set up protective mechanisms regarding salaries.' 1' In the public corporation context, various devices which enhance prospects for achieving
objectivity in setting salaries should be adopted.1 2 When such devices
or mechanisms are effectively used, corporate compensation arrangements
should be harder to successfully challenge.
The ProposedApproach of the ALl

Under ALI Tentative Draft No. 3, compensation payments to directors violate the duty of loyalty owed to the corporation in the absence
of disinterested director or disinterested shareholder approval or permission by the terms of a standard of the corporation,"' if the interested director cannot meet the burden of proving that the transactions were fair to
the corporation.1 4 The Draft, however, takes the position that, in the case
of a transaction authorized by disinterested directors following appropriate disclosure, the duty of loyalty is violated by the interested director only if the directors who authorized the payment did not act in a manner that meets the standards of the business judgment rule." 5 In the case
of a transaction that was authorized or ratified by disinterested
shareholders following appropriate disclosure, the Draft takes the position that the interested director violates the duty of loyalty only if the
transaction constitutes a waste of corporate assets." 6 If there has been
disinterested shareholder approval or disinterested director approval or
if the transaction is permitted by the terms of a standard of the corporation, then the Draft would put the burden of proof on the challenging
17
party.
The authors of the Draft state that section 5.09 is intended to give
disinterested directors wide discretion in fashioning compensation programs, thereby reflecting the deference shown by many courts when
reviewing compensation arrangements."' The Draft also points out that
the action of directors in fixing their own fees for attendance at board
and committee meetings, or fixing a yearly retainer, is a transaction for
111. See e.g., F.H. O'NEAL & R.B. THOMPSON, 2 O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1985). Chapter 9 discusses arrangements to avoid oppression.
112. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3 supra note 4, comment c at 143-44 refers to "institutionalized
procedures for disinterested decision-making which are now widely practiced by large corporations, as reflected in § 3.07, [which] make it less likely that corporations will be disadvantaged by unfair compensation arrangements with senior executives." Comment c at 144
further states: "In many cases the senior executive will not participate in fixing his own
compensation where compensation arrangements are made by a compensation committee
composed of disinterested directors who have no significant relationship with senior executives." TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 8, § 3.07, at 104 recommends that certain
large corporations should have a compensation committee composed of directors who are
not officers or employees of the corporation, and a majority of whom have no significant
relationship with the corporation's senior executives.
113. See supra note 59 for a discussion of permission by the terms of a standard of the
corporation.
114. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, §§ 5.09 (b), 5.09(a)(2)(C).
115. Id § 5.09(a)(2)(A).
116. Id § 5.09(a)(2)(B).
117. Id § 5.09(b).
118. Id § 5.09 reporter's note, at 149.
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which by its very nature disinterested board approval is not available.' 19
Further, so-called "back scratching" arrangements pursuant to which
directors vote to approve each other's compensation as officers or
employees would not constitute disinterested director action.2 0
Analysis
Notwithstanding these barriers to obtaining disinterested director approval, the Draft dilutes the responsibility of interested directors too much
by substituting for the fairness requirement the business judgment or
waste tests in cases involving compensation where there has been so-called
disinterested director or disinterested shareholder approval. Just as with
other interested transactions, the protective impact of so-called disinterested director or disinterested shareholder votes is often questionable.''
It is no easier to justify the legality of compensation arrangements which
a complaining party can prove to be unfair than it is to justify other interested transactions which are proven to be unfair. In addition, as with
other interested transactions, the burden of proof should not be shifted
from the interested director unless the court is satisfied that the disinterested vote reflects a considerable degree of objectivity and protection for
the corporate interest. 22 Although courts may be justifiably apprehensive about deciding the fairness of compensation, they have not been able
to avoid similar issues in other contexts, such as taxation, 123 and the Equal
Pay Act. 2 4 Further, since loyalty in the corporate setting must be assured,
courts should be willing to do what is required. If the burden on the judicial
system is too great, or perhaps just as a matter of sound policy, alternative ways of resolving disputes over compensation should be considered.
The matter of compensation for directors should not be resolved, however,
by undue reliance on devices which may leave investors without adequate
protection.
DIRECT RECOVERY BY SHAREHOLDERS

Although Lynch was a stockholder's derivative suit, in which as a
general rule recovery would go to the corporation, the court permitted
recovery by the individual shareholder Patterson. It reasoned that "courts
sometimes permit pro-rata recovery by individual shareholders to prevent
an award from reverting to the wrongdoers who remain in control of the
corporation.' ' 2 5 The court refused "to order payment into the corporate
treasury in this case and risk necessitating a subsequent suit by Pattera dividend or apply the funds to
son to compel the directors to declare
' ' 26
legitimate corporate purposes. 1
119. I& § 5.09 comment f, at 146.

120. Id.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71 and 80-89.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 71 and 90.
123. See 4 A J. MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 25.80 (discussion of

litigation over the deductibility of corporate compensation for federal tax purposes).
124. Weeks, Equal Pay: The Emerging Terrain, 12 J. COLLEGE & UNIVERSITY L. 41, 44
(1985).
125. Lynch, 701 P.2d at 1130.
126. Id. at 1130-31.
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While the Wyoming court's position may seem entirely sensible, the
reasons it gives are not generally used to justify an individual recovery
by a shareholder.'I" Allowing a direct recovery in a derivative suit, though
unusual, could often be justified by the reasons given in Lynch,'28 but the
analysis did not go far enough. The court failed to determine whether
creditors would be prejudiced by such an award, although it is mentioned
in the opinion that the liabilities of the corporation exceeded its assets
by a significant sum.2 9 The problem is that the corporation receives
nothing by virtue of this suit for the benefit of creditors, and one
shareholder has been preferred. It may be that the court had a reason for
being unconcerned over creditors in the present case. In any event, a court
should make a finding that creditors or other shareholders are not being
unfairly prejudiced before it allows pro rata recovery.'
DISMISSAL OF THE CLAIM AGAINST THE THIRD DIRECTOR

Justice Rooney authored Part 2 of the majority opinion in Lynch since
Justice Rose, who wrote Part 1, disagreed with Part 2. Part 2, supported
by three of the five members of the court, excused Eunice Lynch, a third
corporate director, from liability not because she committed no breach
of fiduciary duty (a question with which the opinion did not really deal),
but because she received no funds and, therefore, should not have to reduce
amounts due from the wrongdoers. The court stated: "If equity allows
direct payment to Patterson so as to prevent the award 'from reverting
to the wrongdoers' and to avoid the 'risk [of] necessitating a subsequent
suit'... then equity should cause the funds to be repaid by those who
received them."'31 The court pointed out that the director fees, officer
salaries, management fees and benefit from the sale of the real property
did not go to Eunice, 32 that the funds were properly returnable by the
Lynches rather than Eunice, 33 and that Eunice would not benefit from
the return.3 4 The court said that this was not a case in which the improper
decision of the board resulted in a loss to the corporation without such
loss going to the directors. Further, the court felt that when the loss results
gain should
in a gain to some directors but not all, those receiving the
35
ultimately bear the responsibility of repaying the loss.
127. W. CARY & M.

EISENBERG, CASES AND

MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 94 (5th Ed.

Unab. 1980).
128. Id

129. Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Wyo. 1985).
130. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Discus-

sion Draft No. 1, 1985) § 7.16 provides:
(e) The court having jurisdiction over a derivative action may direct that all

or a portion of the damages be paid directly to individual shareholders, on a
pro-rata basis, when adequate provision has been made for the creditors of the
corporation and such a recovery is equitable under the circumstances.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Lynch, 701 P.2d at 1136 (emphasis and brackets in original).
Id
Id
Id
Id.
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This part of the decision raises a number of problems. First, the court
offered no satisfactory explanation for its assumption that a director with
such intimate family connections to the interested directors and who voted
for the transactions found to be improper should be placed in a different
category and relieved of liability simply because she did not directly
receive the benefits.'36 Second, the opinion does not state whether the
defendants held liable had sufficient assets to pay the judgment. Although
the opinion in unclear on this matter, it could be construed to leave the
third director in the clear even if that result would leave creditors and
minority shareholders with unpaid judgments. Perhaps the court should
take into account the extent of wrongdoing among the three directors and
allocate the financial responsibilities to them accordingly, but Eunice
should not be entirely relieved of potential liability until innocent parties
have received satisfaction. Finally, the principle on which Eunice is exonerated from liability defeats the important policy of deterrence in cases
involving breach of the fiduciary duties of care or loyalty.
The dissent would have held that Eunice breached the duty of care
owed to the corporation and was jointly and severally liable with the other
directors for damages.'37 The dissenting opinion seems much more persuasive than the majority. In that opinion, Justice Rose, joined by Chief
Justice Thomas, points out:
As a voting member of the board of directors, she approved a series
of transactions which destroyed the corporation while enhancing
the value of a competing partnership composed of her husband
and son. Conduct this egregious violates the duty of care imposed
upon all directors by the Wyoming Business Corporation Act...
regardless of whether she personally benefited from her actions.
The fact that she voted to funnel corporate funds to directors other
than herself cannot, as the majority hold, release her from
3 liability where the duty and breach are clearly established. 1
The dissent cited section 17-1-133(b) and pointed out that "[c]ourts will
step in ...where the directors have wasted the corporate assets and no
rational business purpose justifies such conduct." 3 9 The dissent went on
to state that, while any one of certain actions might not be sufficient to
hold a director liable, the complete pattern of conduct in this case evidenced a program of corporate destruction and violated the duty of care
imposed by Section 133(b). Such behavior, the dissent argued, "cannot
40
be attributed to errors in judgment or calculated business risks.'
136. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
137. Lynch, 701 P.2d at 1139 (Rose, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1137.

139. Id.
140. Id, at 1138. The dissent quite properly cited Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 162
N.J. Super. 355, 392 A.2d 1233 (1978) (director held liable for negligent performance of duties
where corporation unlawfully paid substantial sums to members of her family) and Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (which held that directors who attempt to exercise
their business judgment without obtaining adequate information violate their duty of care
to the corporation).
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In the circumstances of this case it would appear that the dissent could
have expressly presented the duty of loyalty as a theory on which to
predicate liability. The argument would be that Eunice, because of her
close family relationship to the other directors, was in reality an interested
director herself and subject to the same liability as the others.' The theory
upon which liability is predicated may be important in the ultimate allocation of damages among wrongdoers. Since a director guilty of an intentional breach may be held not to be in pari delicto with directors who
negligently permit his conduct, the negligent directors may be entitled
to recover their share
of the liability from the director who intentionally
1 42
breached his duties.
Finally, the dissent quite properly explained that "[dlirect recovery
by Patterson is consistent with a finding of liability on the part of Eunice
Lynch, since she participated as a director in the dissipation of his thirty
percent share in the corporation. Prorata recovery simply prevents the
complaining stockholder's award from reverting to the control of the three
directors who misused the corporate funds..... "14
COMPETITION WITH THE CORPORATION BY FORMER DIRECTORS

The Lynches, in a counterclaim against Patterson, contended that by
forming an oil-field consulting business in competition with LCS, he
44
breached his fiduciary duties as a former director of the corporation.
The Wyoming Supreme Court cited the principle that a director or officer
who terminates his position has a right to open his own business and compete for former clients in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
and held that Patterson breached no duty to LCS shareholders by accepting consulting jobs offered by clients of the corporation after he had
established his own business. 4
As a general proposition, the court's position seems consistent with
established law.'4 However, the Lynches also contended that Patterson
took one exploration job (the Sunmark exploration job) generated by LCS
with corporate funds while Patterson served as director and officer of the
corporation. 4 7 Citing testimony by Patterson that the Sunmark job called
for his expertise, that Sunmark officials wanted him on the job, and that
without him the corporation would not have received the work, the court
141. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4, § 5.08 reporter's note at 132 states that
"[courts have recognized that a transaction between the spouse of a director or senior executive and the corporation will be treated in the same manner as when the director or senior
executive is the contracting party."
142. See 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 1003, at 548 (perm. ed. 1976)
(citing Heit v. Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1967)).

143. Lynch, 701 P.2d at 1139.
144. Id.at 1135.
145. Id

146. Master Records, Inc. v. Backman, 133 Ariz. 494, 652 P.2d 1017 (1982); Parsons
Mobile Products, Inc., v. Remmert, 216 Kan. 256, 531 P.2d 428 (1975); Raines v. Toney,
228 Ark. 1170, 313 S.W.2d 802 (1958). See also TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 4,

5.13 comment f; 3 FLETCHER, supra note 142, § 856 at 23, 24, 26 (cum. supp. 1985).
147. Lynch, 701 P.2d at 1135.
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held that Patterson breached no duty of loyalty by resigning from LCS
and subsequently performing work that was directed to him personally
rather than to the corporation.'4 The failure of the court to state with
clarity the facts on which it based its position limits any meaningful
analysis of this decision. From the language of the court, it is not completely clear whether the Sunmark job had already been awarded to LCS
at the time Patterson resigned. Further, there is no indication whether
LCS could have arranged to handle the work without Patterson.
If the Sunmark job could be considered to belong to LCS before Patterson left, a point which is not completely clear from the opinion of the
court, then the court would have to face the question of whether a former
employee should be able to take away business which the corporation
already has. As a matter of policy, one could conceive of a hardline position flatly precluding such a diversion of business. This would close the
door of temptation to former corporate officials who are willing to try to
take away existing corporate business when they leave. On the other hand
one could conceive of the hardline position with some limited exceptions,
such as situations where the company could no longer handle the business
anyway. Moreover, it would appear that if the corporation already had
the business in hand when the corporate official left, the departed official
should have the burden of proof in justifying the transfer of business to
himself. If the facts justifying the diversion of the Sunmark job were as
unclear as they seemed from the court's opinion, perhaps the loser in the
case should have been the party with the burden of proof.
THE REVISED MODEL BusINESS CORPORATION ACT

It was noted earlier that the Wyoming Business Corporation Act section 136.1 dealing with director conflicts of interest follows the same approach as that of the Model Business Corporation Act section 41.149 Indeed, the sections are almost identical. There is now a Revised Model
Business Corporation Act which contains section 8.31150 dealing with director conflicts of interest. Since this article has given considerable attention to section 136.1, it seems to be a good vehicle for discussing section
8.31, particularly since the latter section is likely to be under legislative
scrutiny in Wyoming and elsewhere.
According to the official comment, "the sole purpose of section 8.31
is to sharply limit the common law principle of automatic voidability and
in this respect section 8.31 follows earlier versions of the Model Act and
the statutes of many states dealing with conflict of interest transactions.'

15

' Section 8.31(a) provides as follows:

(a) A conflict of interest transaction is a transaction with the
corporation in which a director of the corporation has a direct or
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id at 1135-36.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
REVISED MODEL ACT, supra note 10, at § 8.31.
Id. comment 1, at 228.
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indirect interest. A conflict of interest transaction is not voidable
by the corporation solely because of the director's interest in the
transaction if any one of the following is true:
(1) the material facts of the transaction and the director's interest were disclosed or known to the board of directors or a committee of the board of directors and the board of directors or committee authorized, approved, or ratified the transaction;
(2) the material facts of the transaction and the director's interest were disclosed or known to shareholders entitled to vote
and they authorized, approved, or ratified the transaction; or
(3) the transaction was fair to the corporation." 2
It should be noted that there are additional subsections which provide: that the director vote under (a)(1) must be disinterested and must
consist of at least two director votes; that shares owned by or voted under
the control of a director who has a direct or indirect interest in the transaction may not be counted in a vote of shareholders to determine whether
the transaction should be authorized; 153 and that a director has an indirect
interest in a transaction if another entity in which he has a material financial interest or in which he is a general partner, is a party to the transaction, or another entity of which he is a director, officer, or trustee, is a
party to the transaction, and the transaction is or should be considered
by the board of directors of the corporation.'5 4
The language of section 8.31 represents an improvement over section
41 in a number of ways. First, use of the word "solely" makes the limited
purpose of the section more clear. Second, section 41 does not call for
disclosure of the material facts of the transaction to the board or to the
shareholders while section 8.31 does. While a court may well require such
disclosure in order to have an effective validating vote by either the board
or the shareholders for purposes of section 41, it is good that the statute
specifically makes such disclosure mandatory. Third, the word "reasonable" is dropped from the section which relieves the transaction of
automatic voidability if it is fair. This may be an improvement if the word
"reasonable" is considered a less demanding requirement than (and encompassed within the meaning of) the word "fair" or as potentially confusing surplusage.' Finally, the clear rejection of interested shareholder
votes to sanction conflict of interest transactions is wise.
In considering section 8.31, it is important to emphasize that it is
aimed at making an automatic rule of voidability inapplicable to transactions that are fair or have been approved in the manner provided by the
section. The official comment indicates a number of important points in
this connection:
152. Id § 8.31(a).
153. Id. § 8.31(c).
154. Id § 8.31(b).
155. 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED § 8.31 annot. 2, at 966 (3rd ed.
1985) states that "[i]t is believed that the words 'and reasonable' added nothing of substance
to the test of fairness."

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1986

27

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 21 [1986], Iss. 1, Art. 10

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXI

The approval mechanisms set forth in section 8.31(c) and (d) relate
only to the elimination of this automatic rule of voidability and
do not address the manner in which the transactions must be approved under other sections of this Act....
The elimination of the automatic rule of voidability does not
mean that all transactions that meet one or more of the tests set
forth in section 8.31(a) are automatically valid. These transactions
may be subject to attack on a variety of grounds independent of
section 8.31-for example, that the transaction constituted waste,
that it was not authorized by the appropriate corporate body, that
it violated other sections of the Model Business Corporation Act,
or that it was unenforceable under other common law business
principles. 5 '
Thus, section 8.31 leaves to the courts many of the questions which
have been discussed in this article. Its limited role of eliminating the
automatic rule of voidability leaves to the courts the question of what
grounds independent of section 8.31 would justify attacks on interested
transactions as well as questions of burden of proof in such proceedings.
It has been a contention of this article that section 41 of the Model Act
and its offspring should be interpreted in the same way and this contention is amply supported by the official comment to section 8.31 of the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act. 157
Finally, it should be noted that the Revised Model Act does not attempt to define precisely when a director should be viewed as "interested"
but does define one aspect of this concept, the indirect interest. 58 The official comment takes the position that a director should be viewed as interested in a transaction if he or the immediate members of his family
have a financial interest in the transaction or a relationship with the other
parties to the transaction such that the relationship might reasonably be
expected to affect his judgment in the particular matter in a manner
adverse to the corporation." 9 That the problem of ascertaining "interest"
can be a difficult one was referred to earlier in this article. The Revised
Model Act authors are wise to leave it largely uncodified by statute so
that the courts are relatively free to wrestle with it.
CONCLUSION

After the law moved from a rule which made conflict of interest transactions voidable by the corporation. to one which tolerated them if they
were fair, one might reasonably have expected the law to vigorously protect minority shareholders and creditors against the evils of conflict of
interest in cases in which fairness was at issue. Instead, we have reached
a point where an ALI tentative draft dealing with the duty of loyalty pro156. REVISED MODEL ACT, supra note 10, § 8.31 comment 1, at 228.
157. See supra text accompanying note 151.
158. REVISED MODEL ACT, supra note 10, § 8.31 comment 5, at 231.

159. Id
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vides, not without judicial support, that a complaining party such as a
minority shareholder would lose a case in which he was able to prove that
a contract with the director is unfair simply because of a so-called
disinterested director or disinterested shareholder vote approving the contract. As has been indicated, this constitutes overreliance on dubious
weapons. It is hoped that the ALI will ultimately use its influence in the
development of the law regarding conflict of interest in a way that is more
protective of minority investors.
One could look to the states to beef up their corporation statutes to
protect investors against conflict of interest transactions, but competition among the states to entice local incorporation, which has been
characterized as a "race to the bottom,"' 6 0 would seemingly make them
poor candidates for the job of rescuing the unprotected from management
chicanery or impropriety. One suspects that the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act would have little chance for adoption in many states to
the extent that its sections alienate corporate management. Assuming
that the rule against automatic voidability of conflict of interest transactions is here to stay, the approach taken in the Revised Model Act may
be wise since it at least leaves to the courts a fairly untrammeled opportunity to develop the law dealing with conflict of interest transactions.
It may well be, however, that the most effective way to deal with conflict
of interest transactions would be through federal legislation which imposes uniform corporate fiduciary standards since the federal government
would be able to be more strict than the states in dealing with such
transactions.' 6 ' Those interested in the proper development of the law,
including the ALI, should carefully consider calling for federal legislation
to deal with conflict of interest transactions.

160. Cary, Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,

666 (1974) states:
Probably the best example of "the race for the bottom" appears in the Report
of the Corporation Law Revision Commission of New Jersey in 1968, which
stated:
"It is clear that the major protections to investors, creditors, employees,
customers, and the general public have come, and must continue to come, from
Federal legislation and not from state corporation acts.... Any attempt to
provide such regulations in the public interest through state incorporation acts
and similar legislation would only drive corporations out of the state to more
hospitable jurisdictions. (citation omitted)."
161. Id. at 702. Cary speaks of a proposed federal statute, applying to some but not
all corporations, which would allow companies to incorporate in the jurisdiction of their choice,
but would subject them to certain general standards. Among the provisions which a federal
statute might include are "federal fiduciary standards with respect to directors and officers
and controlling shareholders... [and] an 'interested directors' provision prescribing fairness
as a prerequisite to any transaction .. "
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